Another thing is that the non-Pashtuns would never agree or even allow the influx of new Pashtuns onto their land to happen. They would adamantly be against Afghanistan going from 30% Pashtuns to 75% Pashtuns. Afghanistan would fall deeper into despair with larger groups of Pashtuns. The interests of non-Pashtuns would continue to be pushed back and ignored and more of their land would be stolen and given away to the Pakistani Pashtuns. The Afghan Mellat would grow and continue to take advantage of the destitute country and its people to further their agendas. Nationalistic Pashtuns have always forced their goal of Pashtunization unto the country. When not even one third of the country spoke Pashto, the previous Pashtun government still enforced Pashto as an official and national language. They named a major square in Kabul as Pashtunistan Square which refers to the NWFP Province; changed the writings on the currency to Pashto, as well as the writings on passports and the national IDs and also forced businesses in Kabul to change their signs to Pashto, and the governmental and educational institutions to adopt Pashto signs as replacements of the Farsi signs. Think of how much more forms of oppression the non-Pashtuns will face if the nationalistic Pashtuns succeed in bringing more Pashtuns into the country.
Nationalistic Pashtuns of Afghanistan have basically signed the death warrant of Afghanistan and its people with their talks of taking over the NWFP and suspending the Durand Line. It is because of those Pashtuns that Pakistan even began interfering with Afghan politics. As Afghanistan kept threatening to "take" the provinces, Pakistan then had to react and they did so by counterattacking with their own threats via Taliban. Right now, the Durand Line is described as "porous" with little there to stop the terrorists from going back in forth between the regions. Hamed Karzai and his Afghan Mellat advisors need to stop pouting over this issue and take drastic measures in securing the country. They need to accept and acknowledge an internationally-recognized border. They need to start neutralizing those tribal people on their side of the border and stop funding the tribes on the other side of the border.
However, Hamed Karzai's Minster of Borders and Tribal Affairs, Karim Barahowie, (an ethno-centric Pashtun) stood up in Parliament during the swearing-in ceremony and publicly refused to recognize the internationally recognized border between Afghanistan and Pakistan, namely the Durand Line. At the same time, though, Karzai claims that most of the terrorist attacks are initiated by the other side of the Line (a Line he claims not to recognize) and wants Pakistan to step in and control the area. This is a miserable two-sided look at the situation. On one hand, Karzai refuses to acknowledge the Line and, on the other hand, he wants Pakistan to control the territory because he refuses to claim responsibility for those trouble maker tribal people. Those are the Pashtuns Karzai wants to admit into the country and so therefore he should be the one to be held responsible for them. But it is simple enough: If you do not recognize the border that separates you from Pakistan, do NOT blame Pakistan for terrorist actions.
When the whole world including the UN acknowledges something as simple as the border that separates Afghanistan and Pakistan and ethno-centric groups of Pashtuns in Afghanistan can not, then the country will never fully recover. Karzai and the ethno-centric Pashtuns groups need to stop thinking emotionally and recognize what is best for the country, instead of what is best just for one minority ethnic group that they descend from. They need to be practical and realize when they are wrong. If not, then the people of Afghanistan will continue to suffer from the Taliban and foreign interference from Pakistan which would lead to the partition of the Afghanistan.
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